to stimulate intensive economic growth through technology and efficient management practices. Economic reform has been accepted in principle by the Soviet leadership, although there is substantial disagreement over the actual measures to be adopted. 7
In an attempt to stimulate greater efficiency in utilizing natural resources, labor and capital, leaders at the highest level have urged the use of economic levers and incentives in place of administrative actions. 8
With the encouragement and legitimacy conferred by such pronouncements, a number of Soviet economists have advanced innovative proposals embodying market or other economic incentives to environmental protection. This paper examines the alternative approaches to environmental policy problems-economic and administra,tive-available to Soviet policy makers. The approach adopted, in the form of national environmental legislation enacted, gives some indication of the capacity of the Soviet system to entertain new ideas and incorporate them into public policy.
The first section of this paper describes some of the more innovative, non-incremental solutions to environmental pollution advanced by Soviet economists. The second part outlines the actual response of the Soviet government to pollution problems, which consists largely of incremental administrative arrangements. Several of the more important environmental laws will be reviewed in this section. The concluding section makes some general observations about the openness of environmental policy debate in the USSR, and the selection and implementation of alternative environmental strategies.
POLICY ALTERNATIVES: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
As Charles Lindblom has observed, "communist systems rely on authority far more than do the market-oriented polyarchies. 1l 9 Soviet leaders use some market mechanisms (to allocate labor, for example), but they prefer to exercise control through authority rather than through exchange. The willingness to experiment with and use market mechanisms has increased in the post-Stalin era; this is, of course, a primary aspect of Soviet "liberalization" during this period.
Previous research indicated that private ownership of natural resources is the only major economic incentive decisively rejected by Soviet decision makers. 10 Virtually all other types of economic incentives would appear to be ideologically acceptable. Since the mid-1960s Soviet economists have proposed a variety of economic solutions to environmental problems. One category of solutions attempts to force polluters to internalize external costs generated in the production process. To the extent that economic levers have become part of policy, the governmental response has been to adopt a second broad division of economic incentives--paying polluters to stop polluting.
Paying Polluters
Prior to 1975 the Soviet government expected polluting enterprises and organizations to pay for environmental protection measures using money from the enterprise development fund. The fund is a sum of money set aside for capital investment, and for enterprises to make improvements in organization and production techniques. The effectiveness of the fund in raising efficiency has been weakened by the small size of the fund and by overly centralized control through the ministry.ll Ministry officials are reluctant to invest in projects which may tend to reduce overall output or which incur continuing costs. Measures aimed at preventing waste or purifying discharges do both. By 1975, the national economic plan did include specific budgetary allocations for preventing pollution, mandating the expenditure of funds. 12
If enterprise directors did not use monies from the fund, they were expected to divert part of their general budget to pay for the construction of purification facilities, to restore strip-mined land, etc. Directors were· understandably reluctant to jeopardize plan fulfillment by shifting resources away from "productive ll activities. Success and failure in the Soviet system of central planning are based largely on physical output. Additional criteria have been added since the 1965 economic reforms, but the quantitative indicator retains its position of primary importance. 13 The rational enterprise director will devote all available resources to maximizing production of the limited number of products, since their output constitutes his major criterion of success. Salary bonuses, recognition and promotion are contingent upon these criteria.
The bonus system is a form of economic incentive that has become institutionalized in the Soviet system. Logically, in a system where the productive resources are owned and operated by the state, bonuses awarded to individuals should be greatest in the sectors having the highest priority. There is empirical evidence that such a correlation does exist in the Soviet Union. 14 How can we explain these failures to utilize the full amounts allocated?
The source of the problem may be found in the balance of economic priorities existing in the Soviet system of central economic planning. A certain sum may be allocated, say, for the construction of purification installations, but construction enterprises must first fulfill their assignments for priority projects. 2l At present there is only one organization, the All-Union Gas Purification and Dust Trapping Association, whose sole task is the production and distribution of anti-pollution equipment. Created nearly four decades ago, '.J Construction is generally the responsibility of the relevant construction ministry.
In sum, the construction and installation of purification facilities is a low-priority item for virtually all organizations within the economic bureaucracy. These organizations have higher-order tasks that require time and attention; and environmental protection is strictly secondary as an organizational goal. It does not "pay" for an enterprise to devote the 20-30 percent of its basic fund that is often necessary to purify effluents adequately. 25 The easiest solution is simply not to make use of the limited funds that have been allocated. 26
The Polluter Pays
The second broad range of alternatives involving economic incentives assumes that polluters should pay the social costs incurred through production. The theoretical framework on which this assumption is based has been developed by Western economists within the context of market economies. As I will demonstrate shortly, these principles of economic theory are also applicable to the command economy.
Theoretically, pollution and resource waste occur when the market mechanism fails to produce an accurate valuation of natural resources. If it is possible to better the lot of at least one member of society without diminishing the well-being of any other member, then resources are being used inefficiently. Resource allocation, in economist~terms, has fallen short of Pareto optimality. The Pareto optimum is the theoretical point at which all productive resources are utilized (and valued) just equal to their most valuable alternative use. This alternative value, or opportunity cost, is determined through supply and demand in a competitive market economy. Since the value of all resources is maximized, social welfare is maximized and resource "waste" (inefficient use or pollution) reduced to a minimum. 27
In practice, environmental resources are often undervalued because they are not exchanged through the market. These resources have opportunity costs, although the opportunity costs are not reflected in the market price. Thus, firms using the undervalued resources pay only part of the cost. The remainder "spi11s over" into other sectors in the form of technical or physical effects. Economists refer to these phenomena as technological external diseconomies. 28
Official Soviet doctrine maintains that the elimination of private capital confers a systemic environmental advantage on the USSR by eliminating external diseconomies. 29 Most Soviet writers, however, acknowledge the existence of tensions and contradictions between national priorities and the interests of ministries, departments, and enterprises. 3D One writer candidly argued that "nationa1 economic altruism cannot be a realistic basis for branch economic po1icies. 1I31 Symbolic appeals to promote the general welfare were acknowledged to be ineffective. The solution he proposed, however, involved an increased role for central planning and coordination rather than using economic incentives.
Other Soviet economists have advocated schemes that would force enterprises to absorb some or all of the external costs incurred in production. 32
One of the first, V. Shkatov, suggested the adoption of differential rents Water use in the USSR is free of charge in most cases (subject to a fee in special instances), and water use is available to state cooperative, and public organizations, enterprises and institutions, and citizens. Users have the right to use water only for the purposes for which it has been granted, they must utilize water rationally and are obligated to take steps toward the complete cessation of pollutant discharge into bodies of water. Protection of water quality and conservation of water constitute the obligations of enterprises, organizations and institutions using water. Regulation is coor- Given the inability of the Soviet leadership to agree on a specific approach to environmental problems, as suggested by the vague, general character of the earlier environmental legislation, this policy arena has been opened to input by such groups as the environmental economists. 7l Open debate means accessibility, but it also means competition with the established bureaucratic interests in the ministerial structure. In the Soviet Union, the key political resource is organization. Soviet reformers may have complete access to the press and the top leadership, but they do not have the organizational resources which would enable them to compete effectively with the economic bureaucracy.
The result, in terms of policy outputs, is at best an incremental process of change. Over time, a series of incremental changes may yield major differences in policies. The new air quality law, for example, is a fairly sophisticated piece of legislation incorporating effective administrative regulations (such as the maximum permissible emissions standards). This law, which will be implemented primarily through a newly empowered state committee (Gidromet), could go far toward reducing air pollution in the Soviet Union.
Much will depend on the resistance of polluting organizations to the new regulations, and on the extent of the powers~ranted to Gidromet. At the time of this writing, it is too early to ascertain the scope of Gidromet's authority to regulate pollution violators. The future of this organization should provide a valuable clue about the effectiveness of Soviet environmental protection efforts.
